ARTICLE PAGE

Scan the QR code or use the article URL on this page to open the official article record online.

Global Insights Law Journal
ISSN 3141-5717 | Volume 1 | Issue 3 | Month November | 2026

VOLUME	ISSUE	YEAR
1	3	2026

RESEARCH ARTICLE

Foreign Direct Investment in Nigeria: Challenges, Comparative Lessons, and the Path to Reform

Tony A. Francis, Beauty B. Obuh

PUBLICATION DETAILS
ISSN: 3141-5717 Volume: 1 Issue: 3
Publication Month: November Publication Year: 2026
DOI URL: https://doi.org/10.67588/0015
Article URL: https://gilawjournal.com/article/foreign-direct-investment-in-nigeria-challenges-comparative-lessons-and-the-path-to-reform

SCAN ARTICLE

PUBLICATION LICENSES
CC BY 4.0

FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN NIGERIA: CHALLENGES, COMPARATIVE LESSONS, AND THE PATH TO REFORM

Tony A. Francis⁎ and Beauty B. Obuh⁎⁎

Abstract

This article examines the legal and institutional challenges confronting foreign direct investment[1] in Nigeria and draws comparative lessons from China and the United States. Despite an extensive body of investment legislation and institutional machinery, Nigeria's FDI performance remains volatile and heavily concentrated in extractive sectors, while established multinational investors continue to exit the market. The article identifies six structural problems, namely: regulatory volatility and institutional overlap; frequent legislative amendment and policy reversal, particularly in foreign exchange administration; the complications of federalism and uneven state capacity; systemic corruption and weak accountability institutions; gaps in intellectual property enforcement; and the constraints imposed on land-based transactions by the Land Use Act 1978. Drawing on China's negative-list liberalisation, and the United States of America's Committee on Foreign Investment[2] regime, the article argues that predictability and consistent enforcement matter as much as the substantive content of investment law. It concludes that Nigeria's investment framework suffers less from a deficiency of legislation than from fragmentation, weak institutional coordination, and enforcement gaps, and recommends consolidation of the legal framework, a rebalancing of investor protection against the State's regulatory space, strengthened institutional coordination, and targeted sectoral reform, particularly of land administration and foreign exchange regulation.

Keywords: Foreign Direct Investment, Nigeria, Investment Law, Land Use Act, Regulatory Framework, CFIUS, China Foreign Investment Law

1. Introduction

Stating that Nigeria is an investment destination is one of contradiction. On paper, the country has built a comprehensive legal architecture for attracting and protecting foreign capital, such as: investment promotion legislation, bilateral treaties, dedicated institutions, and modern arbitration law.[3] Yet the realistic experience of foreign investors is frequently one of unpredictability, delay, and institutional friction. This article draws on Nigeria's FDI challenges, comparative lessons from China and the United States, and the urgent need for reform. This explains why a well-drafted statute book is not, by itself, sufficient or secure sustained or sustainable investment.

2. Mixed Recent Record

Nigeria's FDI inflows have been volatile. For example, a fall to roughly US$895 million in 2022, a rebound to US$1.87 billion in 2023, a further dip to US$1.61 billion in 2024, and then a sharp

⁎ PhD (NAU); LL.M (IBADAN); LLB (RSUST), BL (NLS), Dip. Applied Th. (FBIPH), Senior Lecturer and Coordinator of Postgraduate Programmes, Faculty of Law, Rivers State University, Nkpolu-Oroworukwo, Port Harcourt; Founding Partner of Tony & Legbor Legal Practice and Consultancy, and Managing Partner, Imperial Spring Law & Partners, No. 27 Mbonu Street, D/Line, Port Harcourt, Nigeria. +234(0)8037792125; tonylegbor@gmail.com; tony.francis@ust.edu.ng

⁎⁎ LLB (UNN), BL (Abuja); beatytorge@gmail.com.

[1] Hereinafter abbreviated and referred to as FDI.

[2] Hereinafter abbreviated and referred to as CFIUS.

[3] KUK Ekwueme, 'Nigeria's principal investment laws in the context of international law and practice' (2005) 49(2) *Journal of African Law 177-206*.

Downloaded from Global Insights Law Journal | gilawjournal.com

148 per cent surge to nearly US$4 billion in 2025.[4] Even with that surge, Nigeria ranked only fourth in Africa, behind Egypt, Guinea, and Mozambique, and much of the growth was traced to a small number of oil and gas project-finance deals rather than broad-based investor confidence.[5] Meanwhile, Nigeria's total FDI stock was approximately US$73.37 billion at the end of 2023, equivalent to 19.6 per cent of GDP. This was however eroded by high-profile exits, including Shell's US$2.4 billion sale of its onshore oilfields and GlaxoSmithKline's withdrawal after fifty-one years in the market.[6] The lesson is that Nigeria's challenge extends beyond attracting new capital to retaining existing investment and encouraging reinvestment.[7]

3. Core Structural Problems

3.1 Regulatory Volatility and Institutional Overlap

Multiple agencies frequently claim jurisdiction over the same or overlapping transaction. For instance, in the oil sector, investors experience the hurdle of navigating the Nigerian Upstream Petroleum Regulatory Commission, the Nigerian Midstream and Downstream Petroleum Regulatory Authority, the Ministry of Petroleum Resources, NNPC Ltd, and various state regulators, each capable of issuing circulars and directives on the same transaction.[8] The Petroleum Industry Act, 2021, though designed to streamline this hurdle, has not resolved the problem, as implementing agencies continue to interpret their mandates differently.[9] A similar pattern recurs in telecommunications and digital services, where the Nigerian Communications Commission, the Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation and the Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Commission each assert partial and imperfectly coordinated authority.[10]

3.2 Frequent Legislative Amendment and Policy Reversal

[4]United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report 2026: International Investment in a Turbulent Era (UNCTAD 2026) <https://unctad.org/publication/world-investment-report-2026-international-investment-turbulent-era> accessed 19 September 2026.

[5]N Abu, MW Staniewski, AAM Gamal, B Obi and MZA Karim, 'The long-term response of FDI to insecurity and corruption: evidence from Nigeria' (2022) 10(4) Forum Scientiae Oeconomia 9.

[6]FB Adegboye, R Osabohien, FO Olokoyo et al, 'Institutional quality, foreign direct investment, and economic development in sub-Saharan Africa' (2020) 7 Humanities and Social Sciences Communications 38; DB Ayoola, 'Impact of Macroeconomic Instability on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Nigeria: An Analysis of GlaxoSmithKline, Kimberly-Clark, and Procter & Gamble (P&G) Exits' (2024) 9(4) Journal of Business and Economic Development 134.

[7]JT Dada and EO Abanikanda, 'The moderating effect of institutions in foreign direct investment led growth hypothesis in Nigeria' (2022) 55(2) Economic Change and Restructuring 903.

[8]G Osuma, A Ayinde, N Ntokozo and others, 'Evaluating the impact of systemic corruption and political risk on foreign direct investment inflows in Nigeria: an analysis of key determinants' (2024) 5 Discover Sustainability 432.

[9]A Adejugbe, 'Foreign Direct Investment in Nigeria; Overcoming Legal and Regulatory Challenges to Foreign Direct Investments in Nigeria: Is the Nigerian Government Doing Enough?' (2013) SSRN Electronic Journal 212.

[10]OJ Mgbakogu, 'Incentivizing Foreign Direct Investment in Nigeria: A Legal Critique of Extant Fiscal and Tax Regimes' (2020) 7(1) Nnamdi Azikiwe University Journal of Commercial and Property Law 132.

License(s): CC BY 4.0
See license terms at creativecommons.org
Downloaded from Global Insights Law Journal | gilawjournal.com

Investors have repeatedly structured their entry around legislative guarantees only to see that those guarantees had been altered mid-stream.[11] The telecoms sector illustrates this vividly: retroactive changes to spectrum fees and quality-of-service penalties culminated in MTN Nigeria's US$5.2 billion fine in 2015 (later negotiated down to US$1.7 billion) for failing to disconnect unregistered subscribers.[12] This penalty was in the interest of security as unregistered phone numbers were being used by some criminal elements to perpetuate various levels of crime, including kidnapping, and so on. Foreign exchange policy has been especially damaging. Although the Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission Act guarantees repatriation of capital and earnings, the Central Bank of Nigeria has often imposed conditions that defer or block that repatriation in practice, producing a persistent gap between legal guarantee and administrative reality.[13]

3.3 Federalism and Uneven State Capacity

Owing to the fact that land acquisition, environmental approvals, and certain licensing sit within the Concurrent Legislative List, investors operating across multiple states face inconsistent requirements. Consequently, disputes occasionally arise over whether a matter belongs to the Exclusive or Concurrent list.[14] The problem is compounded by wide variation in state administrative capacity, with some states' regulatory functions compromised by political interference, inadequate funding, and high staff turnover.[15]

3.4 Seeming Systemic Corruption and Weak Accountability Institutions

Arguably, corruption remains arguably the most cited barrier to FDI in Nigeria, permeating registration and licensing processes, mid-level rent-seeking, and high-level allocation of major concessions.[16] Nigeria's ranking of 145th out of 180 countries on Transparency International's 2023 Corruption Perceptions Index influenced investor risk assessment directly, notwithstanding the index's methodological limitations.[17] The position is complicated further by the extraterritorial

[11]N Nzom and MD Eyyazo, 'Foreign Direct Investment and Commercial Law Reform in Nigeria: A Critical Evaluation' (2025) 12(3) *Journal of Commercial and Property Law 122.*
[12]A Adejugbe (n 9).
[13]IE Chidi, 'Promoting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Nigeria: Challenges and Opportunities in the Legal Framework (2020–2023)' (2024) *Babcock University Journal of History and International Studies 91*.
[14]TO Okegbe, RA Ezejiofor and DI Ofurum, 'Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and Nigerian Economic Growth' (2019) 4(1) International Journal of Accounting, Finance and Risk Management 15.
[15]GS Akpan, 'The Failure of Environmental Governance and Implications for Foreign Investors and Host States: A Study of the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria' (2006) 1(1) International Energy Law and Taxation Review 108.
[16]F Agbede and O Agbede, 'Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and Company Regulation in Nigeria: *Legal Incentives and Barriers' (2025) SSRN Electronic Journal 112.*
[17]Transparency International, '2023 Corruption Perceptions Index' (30 January 2024) <https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2023> accessed 21 May 2026.

License(s): CC BY 4.0
See license terms at creativecommons.org
Downloaded from Global Insights Law Journal | gilawjournal.com

reach of instruments such as the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the United Kingdom Bribery Act 2010, which can expose foreign investors to prosecution at home for conduct considered routine locally.[18] The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission and the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission possess genuine investigatory capacity, but their effectiveness has been undermined by politicised appointments, underfunding, and a judiciary sometimes accused of enabling delay through injunctions and protracted trials.[19] This has pushed sophisticated investors toward international arbitration seated in London, Paris, Singapore, or Geneva rather than domestic adjudication.[20]

3.5 Intellectual Property Enforcement Gaps

Nigeria's intellectual property framework anchored by Patents and Designs Act,[21] Trade Marks Act,[22] and the modernised Copyright Act, 2022[23] aligns reasonably well with international instruments including the Paris Convention, the Patent Cooperation Treaty, the Berne Convention, and Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights.[24] Notably, Nigeria's patent system lacks substantive examination, leaving validity untested except through litigation, and its local working requirement under section 6 of the Patents and Designs Act permitted under Article 31 of TRIPS. However, a source of investor concern has deterred some research-based pharmaceutical companies from seeking patent protection altogether.[25] Piracy and counterfeiting remain widespread despite the efforts of the Copyright Commission, hampered by lenient penalties and courts that have not developed deep specialised expertise, notwithstanding the positive step of establishing an intellectual property division at the Federal High Court.[26]

3.6 Land Tenure Under the Land Use Act 1978[27]

---

[18]Y Omorogbe, 'The Legal Framework for Foreign Investment in Nigeria' (1993) 5(4) *African Journal of International and Comparative Law 909.*

[19]N Tobi, 'Legal Aspects of Foreign Investments and Financing of Energy Products in Nigeria' (1991) 14(1) Dalhousie Law Journal 55; HO Ozekhome, 'Do Regulatory Quality, Government Effectiveness and Rule of Law Matter to Foreign Direct Investment in Nigeria?' (2022) 25(1) Romanian Journal of Economic Forecasting 160.

[20]O Kola, 'Infrastructure Development as a Catalyst for Foreign Direct Investment in Nigeria' (2014) 6(2) Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences 613.

[21] Cap P2 LFN 2004.

[22] Cap T13 LFN 2004

[23] Copyright Act Cap C28 LFN 2004 (as amended by the Copyright Act 2022).

[24] Hereinafter referred to as TRIPS.

[25]FE Okaphor, W Okere, SO Ngwuta and J Okoye, 'Legal and Regulatory Challenges in Moving Nigeria from a Consumption Economy to a Production Economy' (2024) *West African Journal of Interdisciplinary Research 45;* Patents and Designs Act, s 6; Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), art 31.

[26]T Zander, 'Does Corruption Matter for FDI Flows in the OECD? A Gravity Analysis' (2021) 18 International Economics and Economic Policy 347.

[27] Hereinafter abbreviated and referred to as LUA.

License(s): CC BY 4.0
See license terms at creativecommons.org
Downloaded from Global Insights Law Journal | gilawjournal.com

It would appear that the most persistent structural barrier to FDI, is land. The LUA vests all land in the state on its Governor, leaving investors, Nigerians and foreigners alike with a mere right of occupancy rather than freehold title,[28] a position confirmed by the Supreme Court in *Nkwocha v Governor of Anambra State*.[29] Certificates of Occupancy can take five to ten years to process, during which the land cannot serve as loan security.[30] *Section 22* of LUA requires the Governor's prior consent before a right of occupancy may be mortgaged, assigned, or transferred, and the Supreme Court in *Savannah Bank (Nigeria) Ltd v Ajilo*[31] treated non-compliance as rendering the transaction void, a position the apex Court also applied with equal rigour in *International Textile Industries (Nig) Ltd v Aderemi*[32] and *Ugochukwu v Co-operative and Commerce Bank (Nig) Ltd.*[33]

Later decisions have softened, without dismantling this regime. For instance, in *Awojugbagbe Light Industries Ltd v Chinukwe,*[34] the Court held that a mortgage executed before consent is inchoate rather than void. Similarly, in *Yakubu Ibrahim v Simon Obaje*,[35] the Court narrowed the consent requirement to transactions genuinely implicating statutory rights of occupancy. The practical effect, however, is that most commercially significant land transactions remain subject to slow, discretionary governmental approval, discouraging the use of land as collateral and complicating joint ventures and infrastructure projects.[36] Poor cadastral documentation compounds the problem, generating overlapping claims between certificate of occupancy holders, pre-existing title deed holders, and customary land owners, a conflict seen starkly in the Niger Delta.[37]

4. **Comparative Lessons: China and the United States of America**

China's Foreign Investment Law, adopted in March 2019 and effective from January 2020, replaced a fragmented, project-by-project approval system with pre-establishment national treatment and an annually shrinking “negative list” of restricted sectors, while prohibiting forced

[28] O Aluko, 'The Effects of Land Use Act on Sustainable Housing Provision in Nigeria: The Lagos State Experience' (2012) 5(1) *Journal of Sustainable Development* 114.
[29] (1984) 6 SC 362.
[30] N Tobi (n 19).
[31] (1989) 1 NWLR (Pt 97) 305.
[32] (1999) 8 NWLR (Pt 614) 268.
[33] (1996) 6 NWLR (Pt 456) 524.
[34] (1995) 4 NWLR (Pt 390) 379.
[35] (2019) 3 NWLR (Pt 1660) 389.
[36] JO Ezeanokwasa and AI Eze, ‘The Requirement of Governor’s Consent in the Alienation of Interest in Land under the Land Use Act: A Critical Review’ (2021) 2(1) Awka Capital Bar Journal 154.
[37] KUK Ekwueme (n 3); and A Adejugbe (n 9).

License(s): CC BY 4.0
See license terms at creativecommons.org
Downloaded from Global Insights Law Journal | gilawjournal.com

technology transfer as a condition of market entry.[38] China paired this liberalisation with its Measures on Security Review of Foreign Investment, effective January 2021, which established defined fifteen-, thirty-, and sixty-business-day review stages for specified sectors. This demonstrates that market openness and national security screening can operate concurrently within a single, time-bound framework.[39] Nonetheless, China's inward FDI fell to approximately US$114.7 billion in 2025, even as the composition of investment shifted toward advanced manufacturing and technology-intensive activities, showing that legal liberalisation alone cannot guarantee sustained inflows against the backdrop of macroeconomic and geopolitical headwinds.[40] This means that in adopting legal/statutory liberalisation, China must consider such liberalisation in terms of her macroeconomic policies.

The United States remains the world's largest FDI recipient, receiving approximately US$277 billion in 2025 (although a 2 per cent decline from the prior year), with generally open entry subject to increasingly rigorous screening by the CFIUS.[41] Established in 1975 and substantially empowered by the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act 2018, CFIUS assesses covered transactions primarily by reference to national-security vulnerability and the acquirer's ownership structure and foreign-government connections.[42] In November, 2024, a final rule expanded CFIUS's information-gathering and subpoena powers and raised maximum civil penalties. Similarly, the February 2025 "America First Investment Policy" memorandum combined expedited review for allied investors with heightened scrutiny of investors connected to designated adversarial states.[43] In January 2026, the Treasury Department ordered divestiture of a non-notified transaction on national-security grounds, evidencing increasing enforcement proactivity.[44] It is pertinent to state that the scope of covered transactions and CFIUS's review

[38]M Chi and L Zongyao, 'Administrative Review Provisions in Chinese Investment Treaties: "Gilding the Lily"?' (2021) 12(1) Journal of International Dispute Settlement 125; G Dimitropoulos, 'The Right to Hospitality in International Economic Law: Domestic Investment Laws and the Right to Invest' (2023) World Trade Review 66.
[39]R Hui Huang, 'China's National Security Review of Foreign Investment: A Comparison with the United States' (2023) 56 Vanderbilt Law Review 1261.
[40]Y Marco Colino, 'China's Foreign Investment Law: A New Legal Regime for Foreign Investment in China' (2021) 24 Journal of International Economic Law 86.
[41]UNCTAD (n 4).
[42]JH Arasasingham and GM DiPippo, 'CFIUS and the Evolving National Security Landscape: Implications for Foreign Investment' (2022) Center for Strategic and International Studies 112; and UNCTAD (n 4).
[43]US Department of the Treasury, 'Treasury Issues Final Regulations to Sharpen and Enhance CFIUS Procedures and Enforcement Authorities to Protect National Security' (18 November 2024) <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2716> accessed 20 September 2026.
[44]AO Sykes, 'Law and Economics of "Forced" Technology Transfer and Its Implications for Trade and Investment Policy (and the US–China Trade War)' (2021) 13(1) Journal of Legal Analysis 127.

License(s): CC BY 4.0
See license terms at creativecommons.org
Downloaded from Global Insights Law Journal | gilawjournal.com

process are publicly known. This gives investors clarity on when enhanced scrutiny may arise.[45] The United States is also a significant investment partner for Nigeria, with bilateral trade of nearly US$13 billion and US direct investment of US$7.9 billion in 2024.[46]

Three lessons emerge from these comparators. First, predictability matters as much as liberalism: China's shrinking negative list and the United States' defined covered-transaction and review process both give investors clarity on what is regulated, an advantage Nigeria could replicate through a publicly known and periodically revised list of restricted sectors.[47] Second, consistent enforcement is what gives legal guarantees real meaning — China's non-compulsion guarantee on technology transfer and CFIUS's review procedures derive their credibility from the degree to which they are applied in practice, a challenge Nigeria shares given its exchange-rate instability, fiscal uncertainty, and uneven anti-corruption enforcement.[48] Third, China's continued need for economic diversification despite decades of manufacturing-led FDI underscores that Nigeria's oil-and-gas-skewed investment profile requires a deliberate industrial strategy alongside legal reform.[49]

5. Findings

Four finding were made from this analysis. First, Nigeria's legal and institutional framework for FDI is extensive but fragmented. The Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission Act; Companies and Allied Matters Act, 2020; Investments and Securities Act, 2025; foreign exchange and tax legislation, and other sector-specific statutes including: Petroleum Industry Act, 2021; Banks and Other Financial Institutions Act, 2020 and Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content Development Act, 2010 coexist without a coherent coordinating mechanism, thereby creating overlapping requirements and inconsistent administrative decisions.

Second, Nigeria's investor protections covering repatriation, expropriation, and dispute resolution, reinforced by bilateral investment treaties can hardly achieve an effective balance with the State's own regulatory and developmental interests. Perhaps, this is partly because many treaties were concluded when international investment law emphasised investor protection over host-state

[45]I Yu, 'Foreign Investment and National Security Challenges in the Data Age: An Assessment of the Current Regime and Recommendations' (2023) 74 Hastings Law Journal 959.
[46]MJ Baltz, 'Institutionalizing neoliberalism: CFIUS and the governance of inward foreign direct investment in the United States since 1975' (2017) 24(5) Review of International Political Economy 859.
[47]ibid.
[48]T Zander (n 26).
[49]N Abu et al (n 5).

License(s): CC BY 4.0
See license terms at creativecommons.org
Downloaded from Global Insights Law Journal | gilawjournal.com

regulatory space. The emerging AfCFTA Investment Protocol offers an opportunity to recalibrate this balance around sustainable development, environmental protection, and labour standards.

Third, implementation and enforcement weaknesses, institutional fragility, institutionalized corruption, seeming delays in justice delivery by the judiciary, inadequate electricity infrastructure despite the Electric Power Sector Reform Act, 2005 and Electricity Act, 2023, land administration bottlenecks, and intellectual property enforcement gaps undermine an otherwise reasonably comprehensive legal regimes that encourage and enhance FDI. The Arbitration and Mediation Act 2023 introduced valuable reforms, including emergency arbitration, but its credibility depends on the wider institutional environment in which disputes are actually resolved.

Fourth, effective reform must be systemic rather than piecemeal, consolidating overlapping laws and institutions, strengthening the One-Stop Investment Centre as a genuine coordinating mechanism, and digitising administrative procedures with clear service timelines.

6. Conclusion

Nigeria possesses the underlying ingredients of an attractive investment destination: a large, thriving population of over 220 million, abundant natural resources, a strategic West African location, and a growing services sector. What it lacks is not legislation which is arguably comprehensive but the coherence, institutional capacity, and consistent enforcement needed to translate legal guarantees into real-world predictability. Therefore, in order to establish a formidable coordinated reform that will endure, it is imperative for Nigeria to match both law and governance to address institutional weakness alongside the statute book.

7. Recommendations

1. Consolidate the legal framework. Bring the NIPC Act, CAMA, the Investments and Securities Act, and any other sector-specific statutes into a coordinated framework as a unified Foreign Investment Act clarifying entry, incentives, protection, and dispute-resolution rules while clarifying or delimiting any jurisdictional overlap among the NIPC, CAC, CBN, SEC, FIRS, and sectoral regulators.

2. Rebalance investor protection and regulatory space. Modernise bilateral investment treaties to preserve room for public health, environmental, labour, and national-security regulation, using the AfCFTA Investment Protocol as a regional reference point.

License(s): CC BY 4.0
See license terms at creativecommons.org
Downloaded from Global Insights Law Journal | gilawjournal.com

3. Strengthen implementation and coordination of the Institutions. Build genuine information-sharing mechanisms among investment-related institutions, expand the One-Stop Investment Centre's coordinating role, digitise procedures with clear timelines, and support judicial efficiency alongside the Arbitration and Mediation Act 2023.

4. Pursue targeted sectoral reform. Simplify Land Use Act procedures without abandoning legitimate oversight, strengthen intellectual property enforcement institutions, increase transparency in foreign exchange administration, and align domestic investment policy with AfCFTA commitments as part of a coherent long-term strategy.

Downloaded from Global Insights Law Journal | gilawjournal.com

ARTICLE INFORMATION

Foreign Direct Investment in Nigeria: Challenges, Comparative Lessons, and the Path to Reform

Authors: Tony A. Francis, Beauty B. Obuh

PUBLICATION
ISSN: 3141-5717 Volume: 1 Issue: 3 Publication Year: 2026

PERSISTENT DOI
https://doi.org/10.67588/0015

ARTICLE URL
https://gilawjournal.com/article/foreign-direct-investment-in-nigeria-challenges-comparative-lessons-and-the-p ath-to-reform

CITATION
Tony A. Francis, Beauty B. Obuh, 'Foreign Direct Investment in Nigeria: Challenges, Comparative Lessons, and the Path to Reform' (2026) 1(3) Global Insights Law Journal. doi: 10.67588/0015

PUBLISHED BY

Global Insights Publishing

Official publisher of Global Insights Law Journal

PUBLICATION IMPRINT

Volume 1 | Issue 3 | Published 2026 | Editorial Office, Global Insights Law Journal | info@gilawjournal.com | gilawjournal.com

PUBLICATION LICENSE(S)
CC BY 4.0